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The Logic of Rights vs. The Logic of Representation: 
The Case of Cohabitation in Spain†
Blanca Rodríguez Ruiz††
I. PEOPLE’S REPRESENTATIVES VS. COURTS: AN INTRODUCTION
Continental Europe has a history of mistrust of courts.  As Europe is 
well aware, the surge of a new political system never brings along with it a 
fresh civil society.  As a result, forces within civil society inherited from the 
old regime are bound to have some presence in the new political order.  To 
a significant degree, courts often embody these old forces and act as a 
means through which they are introduced.  They are thus regarded as a 
branch of power that enables the importation of vestiges of the old social 
order into the new one.  This thought dominated continental European de-
mocracies after the Second World War and was also present in the democ-
ratic system that came about in Spain in 1978 after nearly forty years of 
dictatorship.  Moreover, this thought has dominated continental Europe 
more broadly through its turbulent democratic history beyond these histori-
cal events.  From the beginning, European democracies reacted against the 
judiciary as a branch of power that served to incorporate the Ancien Regime 
into the new order and strove to limit courts to being, in Montesquieu’s 
famous words, merely “the mouth that pronounces the words of the law.”1
The new democracies in continental Europe aimed to empower Parliament 
in order to let the people’s voice take the lead of political events through 
people’s representatives.  Consistent with this way of thinking, during the 
XIX century European Constitutions only set limits to Parliament at the 
political level, not the legal one. Constitutions were documents with the 
† A shorter version of this paper was presented at the Conference “Rethinking ‘Legal Trans-
plants’ and ‘Mixed Jurisdictions’: When Civilian Legal Reasoning Meets Constitutional Thought”, held 
in Paris in July 2005 and organised by the University of Cornell. I would like to thank all participants in 
the Conference for their comments and insights, very specially Annalise Riles and Mitchel Lasser for 
putting together a most stimulating event. 
†† University of Seville, Spain. 
1
 CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 159 (Thomas Nugent trans., 
Univ. Cal. Press 1949) (1748). 
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same force as any Parliamentary law and could consequently be amended 
by one such law, as embodying the will of Parliament.  Parliament was the 
people’s ally, not their potential enemy.  Their enemies were embodied in 
the King and in other still remaining aristocratic sources of power, on the 
one hand, and, on the other, in the judiciary, to the extent that courts chan-
nelled old-regime values and ways of thinking into the new democracies.  
The realisation that representatives were imperfect and that their actions 
could actually turn against people’s interests came to inform democratic 
thought only later.  Indeed, it constituted a more developed stage within the 
history and ways of thinking of continental Europe.  Originally, threats to 
people’s interests were not found in Parliament, so that having rights 
against it was an unfamiliar political battle.  Threats were found rather in 
the remains of the Ancien Regime present in civil society and in political 
power, of which the judiciary exemplified both.  Hence, enjoying funda-
mental rights against Parliament to be made effective by courts was a con-
cern well-removed from the political efforts of the best part of the XIX cen-
tury.  
This was not the case in the United States.  Here, Congress was indeed 
regarded as the people’s ally, but as a dangerous one, an ally whose role it 
was to enact the will of people, but one always ready to have the tyranny of 
the majority imposed over minorities and have minorities oppressed as a 
result.  People’s representatives undoubtedly had a very relevant role to 
play in the constitutional system of the United States, but their decisions 
could not be trusted to the extent of going unchecked.  The Constitution 
stood as a norm superior to laws enacted by Congress and setting limits to 
them, these limits including a list of constitutional or, in the continental 
European terminology, fundamental rights.  Constitutional or fundamental 
rights were devised as a means to make sure that the majority did not over-
step certain lines, lines that were drawn for the purpose of protecting mi-
norities against majority decisions.  From early on, the role of protecting 
rights fell on the judicial branch, led by the Supreme Court, in a system 
where courts were not subject to the same lack of trust as their continental 
European counterparts. 
As mentioned above, mistrust of courts was revived after fascist ex-
periences throughout Europe, but so was an enhancement of the importance 
of individual rights, conceived as constitutional rights in the style of the 
United States, that is, as provisions included in a Constitution with a force 
superior to that of all other norms.  Rights became the informants of the 
whole legal system and placed themselves above all public power, includ-
ing the legislature.  This means that, in the area of constitutional or, in 
Europe, fundamental rights, some branch of power had to be in a position to 
impose its decisions even over the legislature’s will.  Since mistrust of 
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courts disqualified the judicial branch for this task, a special tribunal, the 
Constitutional Court, was created to deal with infringements upon funda-
mental rights by all branches of public power, including the legislature.  
There then started to take form, both legally and socially, a culture of 
right superseded to, and in a good measure in tension with, the culture of 
having people’s interests protected through representation.  To be sure, an 
important role was reserved to people’s representatives in the definition of 
rights.  The best example is the reserve of law in the development of fun-
damental rights that to some extent prevails in European systems.  Yet an 
undeniable tension arose between the logic of fundamental rights and the 
logic of representation.  Indeed, if rights are to be fundamental, elements of 
a constitution conceived as a norm superior to all other norms, including 
norms enacted by Parliament, then they must apply directly regardless of 
any legislative action.  They must apply directly also against any legislative 
action that contradicts them. Introducing the logic of fundamental rights in 
European systems, which is but the logic of the supreme normative force of 
constitutions, thus poses a direct challenge to European civil-law systems 
and their traditional ways of thinking in terms of representation. 
In Spain, the tension referred to above has been made explicit in some 
instances of incompatibility between the system of protection of rights 
framed in the Constitution of 1978,2 and the one foreseen in the European 
Convention on Human Rights.3  All while keeping in tune with the Euro-
pean tradition, the Spanish Constitution has largely assumed the logic of 
rights.  Thus, Article 53 establishes that only Parliamentary laws can de-
velop fundamental rights, so that rights in need of normative development 
(the right to receive an education springs to mind) need the collaboration of 
Parliament to come into full force.4  Yet Article 53 does not require that 
there must be a law behind any limitation imposed upon a fundamental 
right.  What is required by the Spanish Constitution, as made clear by the 
Constitutional Court on many occasions, and as pertains to the logic of 
rights, is on the other hand that every restriction of fundamental rights be 
endorsed by a substantiated judicial decision.  This requirement is implicit 
in the recognition of every fundamental right and explicitly provided for 
some, as is the case of the right to the secrecy of telecommunications rec-
ognised in Article 18.3 of the Constitution.5  In accordance with this logic 
2
 CONSTITUCIÓN [C.E.] [Constitution] (Spain), translated in 18 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD
5 (Gilbert H. Flanz, ed., Oceana Publications 2004) [herinafter CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD].  
3
 Council on Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, May 6, 1963, E.T.S. No. 5 [here-
inafter ECHR]. 
4
 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD, supra note 2, at art. 53. 
5
 Id. at art. 18.3. 
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of rights, the Spanish Constitutional Court never required that there be a 
law behind the limitation of a right, least of all the right to the secrecy of 
telecommunications of Article 18.3, while being very strict on the require-
ment that every restriction must be based on a judicial decision and that this 
decision be sufficiently substantiated.  
As a supranational document, on the other hand, the European Con-
vention on Human Rights is heavily influenced by the logic of representa-
tion and has a significant degree of deference to the will of national parlia-
ments.  As a result, it requires that any limitation of the rights recognised in 
it be based on a law.  This applies to the right to the secrecy of telecommu-
nications recognised in Article 8.6  In order to account for all systems within 
the Council of Europe, the European Court of Human Rights has given the 
term “law” a broad meaning, so that “law” can be any kind of norm, includ-
ing well-settled judicial norms, that clearly authorises the limitation.  This 
is in any case a different vision of rights from the one assumed by the Span-
ish Constitution.  Their difference was decisive in the solution of the case 
Valenzuela v. Spain, decided by the European Court of Human Rights on 
July 30, 1998.7  Here, the Spanish Constitutional Court had declared inad-
missible a case concerning the violation of the secrecy of telecommunica-
tions on the basis that, in this case, interference with telecommunications 
had been backed by a sufficiently justified judicial decision, paying no heed 
to the fact, as irrelevant in our constitutional system, that beyond the Con-
stitution itself and its general terms, there was no norm, Parliamentary or of 
any kind, authorising the interference.8  This state of affairs did not satisfy 
the European Court of Human Rights, who found a violation of Article 8 of 
the Convention in the lacking of such a clear norm.9  As a result, the Span-
ish Constitutional Court found itself having to accept, though indeed grudg-
ingly, a decision going against the logic of rights that prevails in the Span-
ish Constitution.10
6
 ECHR, supra note 3, at art. 8. 
7
 Valenzuela v. Spain, App. No. 27671/95, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 483 (1999).  
8
 Id.
9
 Id.; see also Blanca Rodriguez Ruiz, El caso Valenzuela Contreras y nuestro sistema de Dere-
chos Fundamentales [The Case of Valenzuela Contreras and Our System of Fundamental Rights], 56 
REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 223, (1999) [hereinafter Our System of Fundamen-
tal Rights]. 
10
 Sentencias del Trubunal Constitucional Sistematizadas y Comentadas [S.T.C.] [Constitutional 
Court] April 5, 1999 (R.J., 49/1999); See Blanca Rodriguez Ruiz El coste de los Derechos Fundamenta-
les. Un comentario de la STC 49/1999, de 5 de abril, 3 TEORÍA Y REALIDAD CONSTITUCIONAL 315 
(1999). S.T.C. (‘Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional’) is a Final Decision of the Constitutional Court; 
A.T.C. (‘Auto del Tribunal Constitucional’) is a Decision of Admissibility of the Constitutional Court; 
F.J. (‘Fundamento Jurídico’) is a Legal Ground for the Court’s decision; finally, S.T.S. (‘Sentencia del 
Tribunal Supremo’) is a Final Decision of the Supreme Court. 
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Beyond this conflict between the Spanish Constitution and the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights as exemplified in the case Valenzuela v. 
Spain, a similar conflict of logic can be perceived within the Spanish sys-
tem in the way it is responding to the needs of protection experienced by 
cohabiting couples. The need of offering cohabitants adequate protection 
has been strongly felt for the last decade.  As we shall see, the Constitu-
tional Court started to take that need seriously at the end of 1992, while the 
Supreme Court did so earlier.  Meanwhile, in 1998, Catalonia enacted the 
first law to regulate cohabiting couples and their rights in Spain.11 Since 
then, as a reaction against the inactivity of the legislature in this field at the 
national level, eleven of the seventeen Autonomous Communities that make 
up Spain have enacted laws on cohabitation, and have done so in the span 
of time between 1998 and 2003, when the laws of the Canary Islands, Ex-
tremadura and the Basque Country were enacted.12
Two branches of public power, the legislative and the judiciary, have 
thus sought to grant cohabitants rights in the Spanish legal system, the latter 
branch encompassing, for our purposes, the Constitutional Court, although, 
strictly speaking, this Court is not part of the judiciary.  They have done so 
differently, as pertains to their different role within the state.  Courts have 
resorted to general principles and to the rights they contain, ultimately to 
fundamental rights; the Constitutional Court has particularly resorted to 
these rights.  In order to do so, courts have scrutinised the situation brought 
before them and have analysed the logic that rules it, in order then to apply 
to that situation the norm that best captures that logic; this mode of pro-
ceeding has been referred to as “principled pragmatism”.13  It is the only 
way of proceeding open to courts when they want to regulate a situation for 
which there is no specific legislation, but also legislators can subscribe to 
principled pragmatism.  They can do so once new legislation is passed in 
relevant fields. Indeed, in areas such as tenancy, pensions, taxes or adoption 
rights, the lawmaker can decide whether cohabitants enjoy a given right by 
looking into the rationale controlling the field in question. 
Alternatively, however, laws can come to create a new legal category 
of cohabitants and assign to them certain formally pre-established rights.  It 
is what the laws on cohabitation enacted in eleven Spanish Autonomous 
Communities have come to do.  In these eleven Communities, unmarried 
11
 Law 10/1998, 15 July. 
12
 Law 6/1999, 26 March (Aragón); Foral Law 26/2000, 3 July (Navarra); Law 1/2001, 6 April 
(Valencia); Law 18/2001, 19 December (Baleares); Law 11/2001, 19 December (Madrid); Law 4/2002, 
23 May (Asturias); Law 5/2002, 16 December (Andalucía); Law 5/2003, 6 March (Canary Islands); Law 
5/2003, 20 March (Extremadura); Law 2/2003, 7 March (Basque Country). 
13
 JEFFREY WEEKS ET AL., SAME SEX INTIMACIES: FAMILIES OF CHOICE AND OTHER LIFE 
EXPERIMENTS 127, 191 (Routledge 2001). 
51
94 FIU Law Review [1:89
cohabiting couples have the rights granted them by the law in question, 
provided that they comply with the requirements imposed by that law.  
These requirements typically are that the partners have lived together for a 
minimum period of time, one or two years, simply that they live together if 
they have a child in common, or that they express their will to be cohabi-
tants in a public document.  Most Communities require, however, that co-
habitants register in a public registry created for this purpose.  In order for 
these laws to apply, partners cannot be minors, relatives up to a certain de-
gree of closeness, be married or be in another cohabiting relationship.  Peo-
ple who live together but do not comply with the mentioned requirements 
find themselves outside the scope of the law enacted in that Community and 
the rights and benefits it provides, as well as the duties it imposes.  This 
raises some questions.  We have, to begin with, the situation of people who 
cohabit, but find themselves beyond the scope of the relevant law because 
they do not comply with the requirements it imposes.  We also have the 
issue of whether cohabitants in those Communities enjoy rights not con-
templated in the relevant law, but recognised by courts.  A further issue 
concerns those laws on cohabitation that merely require that unmarried 
partners live together for a given length of time in order to apply to them, 
indeed in order to apply to them whether they like it or not.  For the law in 
question would apply to those partners even in cases in which they have 
made the conscious decision to stay out of both marriage and legally regu-
lated cohabitation and the rights and duties they imply. 
The regulation of a legal category of cohabitants by the lawmaker is 
regarded in Spain as the most reasonable way of proceeding.  It is thought 
to be the lawmaker’s job to address this social phenomenon and regulate it 
in a comprehensive way.  The reluctance to comply with this task mani-
fested by the conservative central government in power in Spain between 
1996 and 2004 encouraged Autonomous Communities to take the lead in 
the matter.  By doing so, they came to supersede the logic of representation 
to the logic of rights that had been developed by the Supreme and the Con-
stitutional Courts.  Ultimately, tensions can arise in the solution to specific 
cases resulting from these two different logics.  Let us now have a look, 
first, at the logic of rights as developed by the Spanish Constitutional Court, 
and, second, at how the same logic has been applied by the Spanish Su-
preme Court.  We will turn, third, to see the way the logic of representation 
has come to supersede the logic of rights.  
II. THE LOGIC OF RIGHTS AND THE SPANISH CONSTITUTIONAL               
COURT ON COHABITATION
When the Spanish Constitutional Court was first confronted with the 
rights of cohabitants, it had to interpret them from the perspective of four 
2006] The Logic of Rights 95
constitutional provisions.  There is, above all, Article 14 according to 
which, “Spaniards are equal before the law, without any discrimination for 
reasons of birth, race, sex, religion, opinion or any other personal or social 
condition or circumstance.” 14
Article 14 should be read in conjunction with Article 9.2:  
It is the responsibility of the public powers to promote conditions so 
that liberty and equality of the individual and the groups he or she 
joins will be real and effective; to remove those obstacles which im-
pede or make difficult their full implementation, and to facilitate par-
ticipation of all citizens in the political, economic, cultural and social 
life.15
Article 32 then stipulates the application of the Article 14 clause on 
equality in the context of marriage: 
1. Man and woman have the right to contract matrimony with full ju-
ridical equality. 
2. The law shall regulate the forms of matrimony, the age and capacity 
for contracting it, the rights and duties of the spouses, causes for sepa-
ration and dissolution and their effects.16
Finally, there is also Article 39: 
1. The public authorities shall assure the social, economic, and juridi-
cal protection of the family. 
2. The public authorities shall assure the complete protection of chil-
dren, who are equal before the law regardless of their parentage and 
regardless of the marital status of their mothers.  The law shall make it 
possible to investigate paternity. 
3. Parents must provide their children, born in or out of wedlock, with 
assistance of every kind during the time they are minors and in other 
cases where it is legally proper. 
4. Children shall enjoy the protection provided in international agree-
ments which safeguard their rights.17
The first question to be answered is whether Articles 32 and 39 are to 
be read independently, that is, whether the constitutional duty of public 
power to protect the family is independent from marriage.  Their independ 
14
 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD, supra note 2, at art. 14. 
15
 Id. at art. 9.2. 
16
 Id. at art. 32. 
17
 Id. at art. 39. 
52
96 FIU Law Review [1:89
ence is indeed suggested by their being the object of attention of two differ-
ent articles belonging, moreover, to different parts of the Constitution.18  A 
reading of them as independent provisions seems reinforced by the history 
of Article 32.  Indeed, previous drafts of Article 32 linked the right to marry 
to the creation of family relations,19 as is the case of most European Consti-
tutions.20  Yet, in what appears to have been a conscious decision of our 
constitutional framers to separate the notion of family from the marriage 
institution, every mention of the family disappeared from the final text of 
Article 32.  The separation of both provisions is the reading embraced, after 
some initial reluctance, by the Constitutional Court.21  Admitting, however, 
that the family deserves constitutional protection even where it is not based 
on marriage is not the end of the story.  Rather, it brings forth the need to 
define what the family is beyond marriage, where it deserves protection and 
how much protection it deserves in constitutional terms.  In particular, it 
must be determined when a difference in treatment between married cou-
ples and other forms of family is justified under the Spanish Constitution 
and why. 
For longer than ten years the Constitutional Court managed to avoid 
these questions, basically because it did not at heart embrace the independ-
ence of marriage and the family protected by the Constitution.  Only at the 
end of 1992 did it confront the issue with full force and in a radical twist 
established, first of all, that a family is a framework of dependence and 
solidarity that usually (but it seems, not necessarily) entails cohabitation.22
Second, the Constitutional Court found that different treatment between 
families based on marriage and other forms of family could be justified on 
the basis of Article 32, mostly in as far as the preservation of marriage as an 
18
 Thus, whereas Article 32 is included in Section 2 Chapter 2 of Title I, Article 39 belongs to 
Chapter 3 of Title I. 
19
 José Luis Serrano, La familia como asunto de estado, el matrimonio como derecho del ciuda-
dano [Family as a Concern of the State, and Marriage as a Right of the Citizen], 4 REVISTA DE LA 
FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE GRANADA 45, 49 (2001) [hereinafter Marriage as a 
Right]. 
20
 Exceptions are to be found in the Constitutions of the Scandinavian countries and Denmark. 
Some Constitutions even mention the importance of protecting the family based on marriage as the basic 
social institution.  IR. CONST. art. 41 (Ireland); COSTITUZIONE [COST.] [CONSTITUTION], art. 29 (Italy); 
GREECE CONST., art. 21 (Greece).  See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, art. 
16; International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 23; International Covenant 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 10.1.  A similar provision can be found in 
Article 43.1 of the Spanish Constitution of 1931. 
21
 Blanca Rodríguez Ruiz, Recognising the rights of unmarried cohabitants in Spain: Why not 
treat them like married couples?, 2 I-CON 4, 669 (2004). 
22
 In the words of the Constitutional Court,  “La familia es siempre un marco de solidaridades y 
de dependencias” [The family is a paradigm of solidarity and dependence].  S.T.C. 11 Dec. 1992 (F.J. 4 
222/1992).  
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institution is concerned.  Indeed, Article 32 implies the need to preserve the 
institution of marriage as a precondition to exercise the right to marry.  Giv-
ing it certain advantages is therefore justified.  These advantages are justi-
fied to begin with where marriage as an institution is at stake.  Any advan-
tage that goes beyond what the marriage institution requires needs to be the 
object of specific justification.23  This is so, moreover, since Article 32 does 
not only protect the right to marry; it also protects by implication the right 
not to marry.  If we enjoy the right to enter the marriage institution freely, 
we must enjoy the right to stay out of it if we so wish without suffering any 
unjustified legal disadvantages.  Obviously justified are those disadvantages 
implicit in our decision not to enter marriage, disadvantages, that is, that 
correspond to rights attached to the marriage institution.  All other disad-
vantages have to be justified in order not to set undue limits on the right to 
stay out of marriage.  In brief, only differences in treatment that are duly 
justified, primarily as being inherent in the logic of marriage as an institu-
tion, are allowed under the Constitution. Any advantages enjoyed by mar-
ried couples over other forms of family that are not sufficiently justified are 
unconstitutional.  Should they ultimately relate to some circumstance alien 
to the marriage institution, notably to cohabitation, they must be recognised 
in equal terms to all families where the determining circumstance is present. 
We can now ask what these differences inherent to marriage might be 
or what might be the justification of other differences that prevent different 
treatment from turning discriminatory.  What distinguishes marriage from 
other forms of family is that in marriage there is an initial formal commit-
ment to solidarity and to bear with one’s spouse’s dependence, be this 
physical, financial or emotional, a commitment expressed in front of some 
public authority.  Characteristic of marriage is also the circumstance that 
this commitment can only be dissolved by the judiciary and that, where it 
exists, it gives rise to a series of rights, such as inheritance, pensions, family 
relations or the possibility of joined property if consented by the parties.  
We may ask now, however, to what extent do these rights relate, strictly 
speaking, to marriage and not to the existence of such a commitment as 
mentioned above, to what extent does the recognition of these rights not 
find the same justification in other forms of expression of the same com-
mitment, such as when this is implicit in certain facts, whether performed at 
the beginning or during the course of a cohabiting relationship, or even in 
the mere passage of time in cohabitation, as in common-law marriage.  It 
might even be present in some cases where there is no cohabitation in-
volved.  We may ask, in brief, to what extent these rights are justified by 
23
 Id.
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marriage itself or on different grounds and how far these grounds permit us 
to grant preferential treatment to marriage.  
In the end, by looking into the rationale of differential treatment what 
we have is the legal significance of marriage diminished in favour of the 
importance of the family as defined by the Constitutional Court, as a 
framework of dependence and solidarity, a definition that brings forth the 
importance of the family as a sociological fact.  We have the importance of 
the marriage institution minimised in favour of the logic of principled 
pragmatism as controlled by fundamental rights.  This means the ultimate 
victory of reality over fictions, embodied in an important way in the tri-
umph of the logic of rights over fixed rules determined by the logic of rep-
resentation. 
The question of the extent to which marriage can be the object of pref-
erential treatment has not been addressed by the Constitutional Court in 
general terms.  The Constitutional Court has rather confronted each case in 
order to ascertain whether in that case the difference in treatment was or 
was not justified.  It has thus concluded that the right to succeed one’s part-
ner in a tenancy contract, a right initially recognised only to married part-
ners, has nothing to do with marriage itself and has everything to do with 
the preceding cohabitation of the partners in the premises involved.24  Ac-
cordingly, it ruled that that right should be extended to cohabiting couples.  
On the other hand, the Court has been wary of burdening the state with ex-
tra costs and has upheld different treatment between married couples and 
unmarried cohabitants in the field of survival pensions.  The fact that in 
Spain these pensions are called widowhood pensions has been found an 
indication that they conceptually relate to marriage.25  Only in cases where 
partners could not get married because at least one of them was married to 
someone else, at a time when divorce was not permitted, were survival pen-
sions granted, provided that divorce had been sought immediately after 
becoming legally possible.  In the same spirit, though avoiding as far as 
possible to deal with the matter straightforwardly, the Constitutional Court 
has upheld the different treatment of married and unmarried couples with 
children contained in income-tax laws, a difference in treatment this time 
more favourable to unmarried couples.26
The result of the case law of the Constitutional Court on the matter of 
cohabitants’ rights is an equation of their rights with those of married cou-
ples that is carried out piecemeal on the basis of principled pragmatism, is 
24
 S.T.C. 212/1992 (F.J. 5).  In 1994 a new Act on House Rental came to recognise the same 
tenancy rights to married and unmarried cohabiting partners. 
25
 S.T.C. 66/1994, April 25, 1994; ATC 222/1994, July, 11, 1994. 
26
 S.T.C. 41/2001, Feb. 15, 2001.; S.T.C. 212/2001, Oct. 9, 2001; S.T.C. 21/2002, Jan. 28, 2002. 
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at times slow and is often the result of surmounting some previous reluc-
tance on the matter.  There was, as we have seen, initial reluctance to sepa-
rate Articles 32 and 39 of the Constitution.  More recently, the Constitu-
tional Court has come to qualify its previous position that ideological free-
dom is not a legitimate constitutional ground to stay out of marriage with-
out legal consequences.  Thus, the Court has made some limited conces-
sions to the right to remain unmarried in connection with ideological free-
dom and has ruled that marriage must be considered impossible, and there-
fore dispensed with, if getting married would have violated the ideological 
freedom of at least one of the partners.  The case at issue involved the 
claimant’s right to receive compensatory payment for her partner’s political 
imprisonment during Franco’s regime in the same terms as widows.  In this 
case, getting married would have violated the anarchist ideology of the 
claimant’s partner, not because he rejected marriage in general, but because 
he rejected canonical marriage, the rule during Franco’s regime.  At that 
time, civil marriage required a declaration made originally by one partner, 
since 1958 by both partners, that they were not Catholic, which eventually 
implied their declaration of apostasy.  The Constitutional Court found that 
such a declaration would go against the right to ideological freedom recog-
nised in Article 16 of the present Constitution.  For those opposed to ca-
nonical marriage, the only way to preserve their ideological freedom was to 
stay out of marriage altogether.  The Court concluded by equating cohabita-
tion with marriage under the circumstances.27
The equation of cohabitation with marriage on the basis of principled 
pragmatism has therefore been slower and more reluctant in some cases 
than it might have been, but it seems a well-established trend.  We can at-
tribute slowness and reluctance to the prominent role continental Europe 
reserves for legislators and the tightrope on which Constitutional Courts 
have to move in civil-law systems in order to earn legitimacy.  Constitu-
tional Courts must protect fundamental rights, but they can act merely as 
negative legislators whose only role is to determine which parts of laws 
enacted by Parliament contradict the Constitution.  They, on the other hand, 
cannot trespass the line that would turn them into positive lawmakers, a role 
reserved to people’s directly-elected representatives.  Yet the line between 
positive and negative lawmaking activity is not always easy to draw.  A 
decision of the Constitutional Court might be formally negative and yet 
positively affect legislation.  All while protecting fundamental rights, the 
Spanish Constitutional Court is wary of passing decisions that would have 
far-reaching effects on the legal system.  Making such decisions is regarded 
27
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as the proper domain of the lawmaker.  This is doubtless the case when it 
comes to putting financial constraints on public power, as would result from 
equating cohabitants and married couples in the fields of pensions or the 
income tax.  On the other hand, principled pragmatism has presided the 
Constitutional Court’s granting of rights to cohabitants in the field of ten-
ancy contracts.  More importantly, the Constitutional Court has availed us 
of a definition of the family as independent from marriage and of a criterion 
to grant rights to different forms of family, that are well entrenched in prin-
cipled pragmatism and have potential to go far beyond tenancy and the 
rights connected therewith.  Indeed, they have potential to diminish the 
importance of law as fiction and bring about an approximation of law to 
social reality. 
III. THE SPANISH SUPREME COURT AND PRINCIPLED PRAGMATISM
Also, the Spanish Supreme Court has made use of principled pragma-
tism in order to grant rights to unmarried cohabitants.  To this end it has not 
given a working definition of the family. Nor has it established when a non-
matrimonial family deserves protection and how much protection.  It is not 
the role of the Supreme Court to say how the Constitution should be inter-
preted.  The Constitutional Court is in charge of that. The Supreme Court 
has simply looked into the rationale controlling relations and has applied a 
befitting legal framework to the case at hand.  The Supreme Court has made 
use mainly of two notions, the notion of unjust enrichment and the notion of 
irregular commercial society.  On the basis of these two notions it has pro-
ceeded to grant rights to economic compensation to an abandoned partner.  
It has granted rights to an abandoned partner, first, when she (for it is usu-
ally the female partner in a heterosexual relationship who is in this position) 
had fully or partly relinquished her earning possibilities for the sake of 
homemaking and had in that way helped her male partner to do paid work 
while at the same time having his home and his family looked after.  The 
Supreme Court has considered that in those cases the unpaid work carried 
out by the female partner has benefited the male partner to the extent of 
allowing him to engross his riches at her expense, at the expense of her 
abandoning her possibilities to do likewise.  Hence, the Supreme Court has 
applied to these cases the notion of unjust enrichment.28  In addition to this, 
an irregular commercial society has been found to exist where the female 
partner, though without any formal business relationship with her male 
partner, had helped him to set up or run his business, to the extent that in 
28
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the eyes of the law, the Supreme Court said, they should both be regarded 
as informal business partners.29
This is as far as the Supreme Court has found itself able to apply prin-
cipled pragmatism in our legal system.  It has not, for instance, been in a 
position to apply the joined-property financial regime of marriage to unmar-
ried couples.30  Doing so would require a change in the legal framework, 
something the Supreme Court is not entitled to do.  Only the Constitutional 
Court can question the constitutionality of Parliamentary laws, or indeed of 
any norm having the force of law, in the Spanish system.  Yet within the 
boundaries of its role, the Supreme Court’s application of principled prag-
matism has been consistent and determined, indeed more consistent and 
determined than has been the faithfulness to principled pragmatism shown 
by the Constitutional Court.  To be fair, the Supreme Court does not stand 
face to face with the lawmaker and the democratic legitimacy that supports 
it.  Nor does it need to prove its own legitimacy with every decision it 
makes, as a power alien to the traditional three-pronged separation of 
power.  The Supreme Court is embedded within the judiciary as the highest 
court of the land and benefits from the legitimacy entailed in the activities 
of all judicial courts.  The Supreme Court has thus always been concerned 
with imparting justice in the case brought before it, without any further 
considerations concerning its own legitimacy or the proper distribution of 
power among the different branches of power.  The Supreme Court works 
within a given legal framework established primarily by the lawmaker.  
This framework includes legal rules and legal principles and is certainly 
headed by the Constitution and fundamental rights, but the Supreme Court 
can only apply it in as far as the lawmaker has provided.  Indeed it cannot 
apply it against the provisions of the lawmaker.   
The Supreme Court, in a word, acts from within the logic of civil-law 
systems, a logic where the will of the lawmaker is not put into question.  
Facing the lawmaker’s inactivity, it simply applies the general principles of 
the system to the cases before it.  It pertains not to the Supreme Court, but 
to the Constitutional Court to impose the Constitution onto the lawmaker, 
thus challenging her traditional role in our civil-law system. 
IV. LAWS ON COHABITATION
The lawmaker has not wanted to miss the lead on cohabitation matters.  
As was mentioned above, eleven of Spain’s seventeen Autonomous Com-
munities have enacted laws on cohabitation in light of the inactivity of the 
29
 See STS, May 18, 1992 (R.J., No. 4907, p. 6449). 
30
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55
102 FIU Law Review [1:89
central Parliament on the subject.  These laws respond to the purpose of 
simplifying the legal framework of cohabitation, thereby simplifying also 
courts’ endeavours to grant cohabitants rights that befit their situation.  
They have done so in a very civil-law-like manner, aiming to offer a poten-
tially complete regulation of the situation of cohabitants, in matters, that is, 
that can be regulated by Autonomous Communities.  The first thing to be 
noted is that, with two exceptions,31 these laws only regulate the situation of 
couples who live as if married; the situation, that is, of cohabitants united 
by para-conjugal love.  With the exception of the regulation offered by the 
two laws referred to above, all other living circumstances remain unregu-
lated.  Recognising any respective rights remains a question for courts to 
settle, to be decided from within the logic of principled pragmatism, even-
tually with reference to fundamental rights.  Also note that these laws apply 
explicitly or implicitly to both different-sex and same-sex couples.  Indeed, 
these laws came to a great extent to make up for the lack of a legal right of 
same-sex couples to marry.  Such a right has been recently recognised by 
central Parliament;32 indeed, according to the Constitution, it can only be 
recognised by central Parliament, not by the Parliaments of Autonomous 
Communities. 
Laws have thus mostly concentrated on the rights of cohabiting cou-
ples.  As has been mentioned, it is indeed the case that according to Article 
149.1.8º of the Spanish Constitution, the regulation of marriage is a matter 
under the jurisdiction of the central state, not Autonomous Communities.33
This Article divides Autonomous Communities for our purposes into two 
groups: those that traditionally have their own civil regulations (foral law) 
and those without any such regulations.  According to Article 149.1.8º of 
the Spanish Constitution, the former group of Autonomous Communities 
may go further in the regulation of civil matters.34  They may in particular 
go as far as necessary to preserve, modify or even develop their foral law.35
All other Autonomous Communities may not regulate civil matters.  That 
makes their scope of action in the regulation of cohabitation rather limited.  
This is the case of Andalucía, Asturias, Canarias, Extremadura, Madrid and 
Valencia.36  As a result, laws on cohabitation in these Communities are 
31
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rather brief.  They mostly regulate the requirements for cohabitation as a 
couple under the law and the circumstances of the dissolution of that cou-
ple.  They also foresee the possibility for cohabiting couples to write their 
financial agreements in a public document and grant partners rights and 
duties in their relations with the public administration of the Autonomous 
Community in question as if they were married.  
Autonomous Communities with their own foral law offer, on the other 
hand, a more thorough regulation of cohabitation.  This is the case of 
Aragón, Baleares, Catalonia, Navarra and the Basque Country.  They regu-
late the financial effects of cohabitation, its effects on common children and 
the consequences of its dissolution by one party’s will or death, especially 
inheritance.  In addition to this, all these Communities but Baleares regulate 
the possibility for all cohabiting couples, whether they are different-sex or 
same-sex, to adopt jointly, a matter of controversy at both the political and 
the constitutional level.37  Politically, much heat has been taken off the mat-
ter by the central state’s granting to same-sex couples the right to marry in 
the same conditions and with the same rights as different-sex couples, in-
cluding the right to adopt jointly. 
Thus, lawmakers in eleven Autonomous Communities have given a 
very traditional response to cohabitation as a new social phenomenon 
within our civil-law tradition.  The lawmaker has made cohabitation a new 
area of concern, a well-defined field in need of comprehensive regulation.  
To this end, it has responded to what it perceives to be the needs of cohabi-
tants as a block and is satisfied to see their situation become the object of 
independent and comprehensive regulation.  In this sense, eleven Autono-
mous Communities have fulfilled the role traditionally played by the central 
legislature. 
V. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
Cohabitation is a rather new social phenomenon and cohabitants feel 
they need responses by the legal system to the lack of protection they ex-
perience.  Certainly, people who decide to forgo marriage also decide to 
forgo the rights and duties attached to it, but they do not decide to forgo 
legal protection altogether.  How far they should expect protection is the 
matter at issue and how we handle it reveals the profile of our legal sys-
tems.  Having a legal category of cohabitants created by the lawmaker and 
granting them rights and duties would be the traditional response of civil 
legal systems.  In these systems the lawmaker would be left to deal with the 
37
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matter.  This response, however, leaves aside deeper questions, such as 
what rights and duties the system as it is already grants cohabitants through 
the general principles on which it rests and, more importantly, what cohabi-
tants’ rights and duties are already recognised in the Constitution. Of these 
two questions, the first one can be couched within civil-law systems with-
out distortion, although giving it an answer means granting courts more 
power than they were supposed to have within these systems.  The second 
question, on the other hand, introduces the logic of fundamental rights and, 
in so doing, sets two opposite logics in operation: it brings the logic of 
civil-law systems in direct confrontation with constitutional ways of think-
ing in terms of fundamental rights. 
Laws on cohabitation leave unanswered the questions posed above—
namely what are the rights and duties of cohabitants embedded in the sys-
tem as it is, both in its general principles and in constitutional rights.  These 
laws do not face the question of the logic of cohabiting relationships, of the 
constitutional notion of the family, or of what differences between matri-
mony and other forms of family are justified and on which grounds.  In as 
far 86 F.3d 916 as these questions continue to assail cohabitation, however, 
they will continue to be raised where the response of the laws seems insuf-
ficient and we will then have to wonder whether the absence of explicit 
legal regulation is due to the lawmaker’s lack of foresight or to her will to 
leave a circumstance out of the law, thereby regulating it by implication.  
Moreover, conflicts between the lawmaker and the Constitutional Court are 
bound to arise.  The ways of proceeding of civil-law systems would then 
have to face the logic of rights and constitutional thought. 
Although recognizing the rights of both different- and same-sex co-
habitants enjoys high social support in Spain, as a social phenomenon co-
habitation is rather new here.  Compared with other European countries, 
Spain has a low proportion of cohabitants (less than 3% for all age groups 
between twenty and thirty-four, both for men and women, in the late nine-
ties).38 Moreover, cohabiting couples in Spain tend to have medium to high-
income levels.39  This results in the low number of cases of conflicts be-
tween cohabitants that have been known by courts.  No case that I know of 
has, as of yet, posed a conflict between a law on cohabitation and funda-
mental rights, or between a law and the general principles of the system.  
Spanish laws on cohabitation are, let us remember, rather new.  Yet in the 
end conflict seems inevitable and the logic of rights will have to prevail 
38
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over the logic of representation.  This result is a consequence of placing 
civil-law systems under the authority of a constitutional text.  It seems to be 
in the nature of things that such a text should have the final say. 
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